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Social harm involves incidents resulting in physical, financial, and emotional hardships such as 
crime, drug overdoses and abuses, traffic accidents, and suicides. These incidents require various 
law-enforcement and emergency responding agencies to coordinate together for mitigating their 
impact on the society. With the advent of advanced networking and computing technologies 
together with data analytics, law-enforcement agencies and people in the community can work 
together to proactively reduce social harm. With the aim of effectively mitigating social harm 
events in communities, this thesis introduces a distributed web application, Community Data 
Analytic for Social Harm (CDASH). CDASH helps in collecting social harm data from 
heterogenous sources, analyzing the data for predicting social harm risks in the form of geographic 
hotspots and conveying the risks to law-enforcement agencies. Since various stakeholders 
including the police, community organizations and citizens can interact with CDASH, a need for 
a trust framework arises, to avoid fraudulent or mislabeled incidents from misleading CDASH. 
The enhanced system, called Trusted-CDASH (T-CDASH), superimposes a trust estimation 
framework on top of CDASH. This thesis discusses the importance and necessity of associating a 
degree of trust with each social harm incident reported to T-CDASH. It also describes the trust 
framework with different trust models that can be incorporated for assigning trust while examining 
their impact on prediction accuracy of future social harm events. The trust models are empirically 
validated by running simulations on historical social harm data of Indianapolis metro area.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
Humans, being a part of society, interact and share a relationship with nature and one another. 
These interactions pave way towards diverse social formations resulting in the establishment of 
lawful processes within the society [1]. Nevertheless, these interactions can become harmful. 
Pemberton [2] offers an explanation on when a social formation can become harmful: “[A]n 
individual is harmed through the non-fulfilment of their needs”. Such a non-fulfilment of needs 
leads towards social harm incidents in the society. Social harm is “a concept that enables 
criminology to move beyond legal definitions of ‘crime’ to include immoral, wrongful and 
injurious acts that are not necessarily illegal” [3]. This thesis proposes the use of technology to 
mitigate social harm incidents through efficient utilization of law-enforcement resources in the 
society. 
1.1 Social Harm 
Social harm, as the name suggests, includes incidents that cause socio-economic harm to the 
society. Thereby, along with legally defined criminal activities, social harm also includes incidents 
involving physical, financial, and emotional harms such as drug overdoses and abuses, traffic 
accidents, and suicides. It encompasses any incident causing damage to the society irrespective of 
it being intentional or not. Thus, Hillyard and Tombs [3], consider social harm more responsive to 
causes of human suffering than legally defined crimes. 
1.2 Impact of Social Harm 
One way of quantifying the impact of social harm is by estimating the economic burden borne by 
the society due to such incidents. Social scientists view costs associated with crimes in two aspects, 
tangible and intangible costs [4]. Tangible costs refer to direct monetary cost to the society 
including loss in business, damage to property, medical expenses etc. Intangible costs include 
psychological impacts resulting in fear and loss of productivity among victims. In this research, 
one key observation from the social harm data (2012-2013) provided by the Indianapolis 
Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) for Indianapolis metro area was that the social harm 
incidents incurred approximately $1,980,567,045 cost to Indianapolis in 2012-2013 [5]. This 
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indicates that heterogeneous social harm events, including crimes such as robbery, assault, 
homicides, etc., along with traffic crashes and drug abuses, affect communities adversely and 
police, fire, health, and social service departments must work together to prevent and mitigate such 
harms. 
1.3 Dealing with Social Harm 
Researchers and police departments have proposed various ways to alert communities about social 
harm events. Weisburd and Eck [6] discuss four different approaches to policing including the 
Standard Model of policing, Community policing, Hotspots policing, and Problem-oriented 
policing. They use research evidences for measuring the effectiveness of these approaches on three 
dimensions: reducing crime, disorder and fear in the community. They present that proactive 
policing strategies such as Hotspots policing, and Problem-oriented policing prove to be most 
effective on all three dimensions followed by collaborative strategy such as Community policing 
which only helps in reducing fear among citizens and lastly reactive strategy such as Standard 
Model of policing which seems to be most ineffective for dealing with crimes. One way of 
proactive policing is through geographic profiling [7] – it helps to analyze regions with connected 
crimes to identify likely areas of offender’s residence. Also, data mining, machine learning, and 
software tools are being used for predicting social harm. A lot of research work has been conducted 
to utilize machine learning in crime prediction. McClendon and Meghanathan, in [8], have 
compared different machine learning algorithms, such as Linear Regression, Additive Regression, 
and Decision Stump, on violent crimes data for their effectiveness in crime prediction. Kiana et 
al., in [9], have used data mining techniques, such as clustering and classification, for discovering, 
investigating and analyzing patterns for occurrence of different crimes. Wang et al., in [10], 
proposed forecasting of crime in near real-time using the spatio-temporal deep learning technique. 
These prevalent approaches are, however, limited to few crime types and data sources. They may 
lead to a limited view towards efficient social harm policing in the society. Additionally, none of 
them takes into consideration the trust associated with data (either historical or live) being fed to 
the prediction models. Trustworthiness of the data may affect the prediction accuracy of the crime 
predicting model(s). 
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1.4 Motivation 
Identifying high-risk areas helps the authorities to employ their resources efficiently – this 
approach seems to be the important next step in social harm prediction and “predictive policing”. 
The “routine activities” approach is a leading sociological theory based on the premise that 
criminal events result from interactions between likely offenders and suitable targets occurring 
non-randomly in space and time [7]. Finding patterns of social harm using the historical data and 
clubbing it with live events reported by people living in the community can help in reducing social 
harm events. 
Additionally, not much research has been conducted in interrelating 911’s call for service 
data with the post investigating data relating to social harm. Such an interrelationship can help in 
analyzing social harm patterns in the society. By analyzing these patterns, false social harm alarms 
can be reduced thereby leading towards optimal allocation of law-enforcement resources. 
Lastly, encouraging participation from various sections of the society can help in 
proactively reducing social harm. To achieve this, there is a need for a platform where various 
stakeholders including law-enforcement agencies, community organizations and citizens can 
easily and anonymously report live social harm incidents. 
With these in consideration, this thesis proposes a platform for collecting and analyzing 
social harm events. 
1.5 Overview of Proposed Approach 
The specific objectives of this thesis are: 
• To generate social harm hotspots and associated recommendations for directed and predictive 
policing, on a periodic basis, using historical and live social harm data. 
• To associate trust with each live social harm incident and use it in the predictive modeling. 
• To empirically evaluate the proposed approaches using the data provided by the IMPD. 
 
To achieve these objectives, firstly, a distributed web application, Trusted Community Data 
Analytics for Social Harm (T-CDASH) is created. T-CDASH helps in generating social harm 
hotspots and communicating risks to law-enforcement agencies while allowing interactions with 
various stakeholders including the police, community organizations and citizens. It also helps in 
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providing recommendations for performing specific actions to police officers while patrolling in 
the areas indicated as hotspots. Feedback from patrolling officers are also fetched in real-time. 
Along with this, real-world social harm records are collected, analyzed and preprocessed for 
generating hotspots. Lastly, a trust framework consisting of multiple trust models is developed, to 
assign a degree of trust with each social harm record. Eventually, the trust models are empirically 
validated and compared for their accuracy. 
1.6 Audience 
The core focus of this thesis is to assign trust with live social harm events. The trusted incidents 
are considered for predicting social harm hotspots. Also, as mentioned before, there are various 
stakeholders associated with the system including the police department, community organizations 
and citizens. Although there are many stakeholders, currently, the hotspots are utilized only by the 
police department for efficient allocation of patrolling officers. Having an efficient trust 
framework in place will result in having a higher degree of trust over the hotspots generated. This 
in turn will benefit the patrolling officers as it will ultimately provide them with hotspots which 
can be highly trusted thereby leading towards efficient patrolling. 
1.7 Organization 
This thesis is organized in five chapters. The first chapter introduces the aim of the thesis followed 
by the motivation and overall approach. The second chapter presents related research work in the 
social harm domain. The third chapter provides the architecture of the proposed system along with 
the design of trust framework with various trust models for associating a degree of trust with social 
harm events. Additionally, it describes the social harm data from multiple sources together with 
its preprocessing and interrelationships for evaluating the trust models. The fourth chapter 
compares the performance of the trust models while analyzing the impacts of empirical estimations 
within the system. Finally, chapter 5 discusses the conclusions and provides directions for future 
work. 
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 RELATED WORK 
This chapter discusses related research efforts from the domain of social harm detection, 
prediction, and prevention. It also discusses the importance and techniques for incorporating ‘trust’ 
in distributed software systems.  
2.1 Social Harm Prediction and Prevention 
In today’s society, as observed by Greene [11], the role of police has evolved from just dealing 
with violent crimes to dealing with social harm incidents such as vehicles crashes, vandalism, and 
drug overdoses [12][13]. In the context of this observation, a lot of research has been carried out 
to analyze and predict social harm incidents in the society. Foot patrolling has been long considered 
a “proactive, non-threatening, community-oriented approach to local policing” [14]. Field surveys 
conducted in Philadelphia, Kansas City and New Jersey [15-19] depicted that foot patrolling did 
not have much impact in reducing crimes. Researches have shown that directed and proactive 
policing can contribute significantly in reducing crime and social harm incidents [20-25]. 
2.2 Social Harm Data 
This thesis considered data from three different sources: Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD), 
Records Management System (RMS) and Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR). As explained by Law 
Enforcement Information Technology Standards Council (LEITSC) in [26], the CAD system 
assists in performing public safety operations in an automated manner. It includes incident 
reporting, emergency vehicle dispatch along with incident tracking and management capabilities. 
Information captured by CAD later assists in creating RMS reports. LEITSC [27] describes RMS 
as an agency-wide system for recording, persisting and retrieving information and documents 
related to law enforcement operations. Although RMS allows multiple incident reporting 
mechanisms, it records only a single entry for each incident. UCR, on the other hand, consists of 
data collected from four systems: The National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), the 
Summary Reporting System (SRS), the Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) 
Program, and the Hate Crime Statistics Program [28]. This data is used by law enforcement 
agencies for administrating and managing social harm incidents. All the above systems help in 
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maintaining the entire lifespan of an incident right from its initial reporting to its completion. 
Although these systems help immensely in tracking and analyzing social harm incidents in the 
society, limited work has been done in establishing any kind of interrelation between them. Such 
an interrelationship will help in reconciling the social harm incidents reported to the police with 
the incidents investigated and officially recorded by them. A unique contribution of this thesis is 
the interrelationship that it establishes between these systems for analyzing the incidents that are 
common between them. 
Since social harm data is a time series data, time series data validation was performed on the 
social harm records. Data cross validation was performed to analyze its impact on the performance 
of various trust models of T-CDASH. Tashman [29] proposed various techniques including Fixed 
Origin, Rolling Origin, and Rolling Windows for selecting in-sample data for training the 
prediction module. In Fixed Origin, the origin remains fixed at a particular period, T, while 
predictions are generated for periods T+1, T+2, … T+N. Since the origin remains fixed, this 
technique is prone to errors due to data unique to the origin. Rolling Origin, on the other hand, 
considers multiple origins by increasing the in-sample data in each forecasting iteration. This helps 
in alleviating the concerns related to Fixed Origin. Rolling Windows are similar to Rolling Origin 
but maintain constant in-sample size by pruning oldest records. Pruning helps in clearing old data 
thereby helping in updating model coefficients. This thesis has used Rolling Origin and Rolling 
Windows techniques for analyzing their impact on hotspot predictions. 
2.3 Statistical Modelling and Machine Learning in Social Harm Domain 
Plenty of research work has been carried out in utilizing software tools for predicting and 
mitigating social harm in the society. Multiple machine learning techniques have been used for 
analyzing and predicting crime and social harm along with software applications for reporting and 
displaying live crime events. A lot of literature is also available on the use of machine learning 
and data analysis to predict social harm hotspots and patterns. Various machine learning and data 
mining algorithms (as indicated below) are applied, in order to gain insights of different types and 
sources of crime and social harm. 
Bogomolov et al. [30] used demographics and mobile data for predicting crimes. They used 
human behavioral data in the anonymized form derived from demography and through mobile 
phone activity together with open crime data of London metropolis. Random Forest algorithm was 
16 
 
used to predict whether a geographic location will be a crime hotspot in the next month or not. 
They achieved 70% accuracy in their crime predictions. However, one of the limitations of their 
work was availability of data. The data was aggregated on monthly basis leading to predicting 
crimes for next month rather than predicting for next week, day, or hour. 
Yu et al. [31] have utilized temporal, spatial, societal, and ecological factors in forecasting 
crime. They designed and developed a Cluster-Confidence-Rate-Boosting (CCRBoost) algorithm 
to analyze historical crimes in the spatio-temporal domain and generate spatio-temporal patterns 
based on them. They used January 2006 to December 2009 crime data of a northeastern US city 
obtained through a police department. They evaluated their algorithm on the residential burglary 
crime type and found it to achieve an impressive 80% accuracy in predicting future residential 
burglaries. However, the algorithm was evaluated only on a single crime type leaving a question 
about its usability with multiple crime types clubbed together. 
Chen et al. [32] performed sentiment analysis on the Twitter data; combining it with 
weather and historical crime data for predicting future crimes. They gathered the Twitter data of 
Chicago area from January 1 to January 31, 2014. Chicago’s weather data was obtained from the 
Weather Underground website. They also utilized the historical theft data obtained from the 
Chicago Police Department collected from December 25, 2013 to January 31, 2014. Sentiment 
analysis was performed on this dataset by applying lexicon-based methods combined with Kernel 
Density Estimation and linear modelling for forecasting thefts. Their approach was able to capture 
approximately 42% crime with about 20% area of Chicago under consideration. However, in their 
work, they did not specify any direct connection between tweets and specific crime types. Also, 
the authenticity of tweets was not considered. 
Mohler et al. in [5] proposed a modulated Hawkes process for indexing social harm 
incidents. The indexing was based on the expected cost of the incidents towards the community. 
This index was utilized while ranking the hotspots over time for their significance. They obtained 
social harm data including crimes, drug overdoses, and vehicle crashes from various government 
agencies such as the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD), the Indianapolis 
Emergency Medical Services, and the Indiana State Police using the Automated Reporting 
Information Exchange System (ARIES) for 2012-2013. Hawkes process forecasted crime through 
an intensity function based only on historical social harm events which modelled long term 
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intrinsic and short-term dynamic risks and estimated trends. Hawkes process, as proposed, 
captured approximately 20% of social harm cost in about 2% of space-time. 
This thesis utilizes the Hawkes process model as proposed in [5] for predicting social harm 
incidents and generating hotspots. 
2.4 Trust 
An important aspect in predicting future by analyzing current and historical events is the 
trustworthiness of the available data. In order to generate reliable predictions, it is important for 
the data to be credible – i.e., there is a need to consider the trust associated with the data. 
Accordingly, while predicting social harm with data from heterogeneous sources, it is necessary 
to associate trust with each social harm incident used in predictions. Association of trust will help 
in reducing misleading and/or fraudulent social harm reports along with any data recording 
inaccuracies. Researchers have done a lot of work for estimating trust in distributed software 
environments. Jøsang [33] introduced a framework based on an opinion model and subjective logic 
for associating trust with events. Subjective logic views any proposition as not being either true or 
false but rather on the basis of subjective belief (b), disbelief (d) and ignorance/uncertainty (i/u). 
That is, opinions regarding a proposition translate in varying degrees of belief, disbelief and 
uncertainty. The belief, disbelief and uncertainty are calculated based on evidential reasoning. For 
any proposition, positive evidences supporting the proposition contribute towards high belief. 
Similarly, negative evidences opposing the proposition contribute towards high disbelief. Since, 
each proposition can have multiple opinions, subjective logic provides various operators, including 
Conjunction, Disjunction, Negation, Recommendation, and Ordering, for combining the opinions. 
This thesis uses the concept of the opinion model for assigning certain degree of belief, disbelief, 
and uncertainty to each social harm incident before utilizing them for hotspot predictions. 
Ceolin et al. [34] have designed a trust algorithm based on Subjective Logic as indicated 
by Jøsang in [33]. They applied the algorithm to a use case for tracking ships in maritime domain. 
The algorithm calculated the level of belief, disbelief and uncertainty associated with each event 
as follows: 
b = 
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑛
 
d = 
𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑛
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u = 
𝑛
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑛
 
a = 
1
𝑛
 
In this, b, d, u were the degree of belief, disbelief and uncertainty respectively and a was the 
probability that proposition was true in the absence of evidence (a priori probability) and n was 
number of the possible outcomes. This thesis uses a similar approach in the domain of social harm 
prediction for associating trust with social harm incidents. For each incident, belief, disbelief, and 
uncertainty are computed (using the above formulae) taking various factors into consideration as 
described in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Another popular way of associating trust with events is through the reputation model. As per 
Wikipedia, “Reputation systems are programs that allow users to rate each other in online 
communities in order to build trust through reputation.” [35]. Furtado et al. [36] describe the 
WikiCrimes system and the trust management mechanism incorporated within it. They have 
depicted WikiCrimes as a platform for reporting and analyzing live crime incidents. In their work, 
they have presented ways for allowing a high degree of people participation, while maintaining 
high credibility of the information reported by the people. WikiCrimes builds a reputation model 
and uses the reputation score of the user while associating trust with the user-reported event. The 
users are registered in WikiCrimes with name and email addresses. As the events reported by a 
user gets verified by more and more other reputed users (e.g., law-enforcement entities), the 
reputation score and the credibility of the reporter increases. Also, trustworthiness of a reported 
information increases, the more it is confirmed. Thus, the reputation of a user is built through 
interactions. However, there are two key concerns with the reputation-based model in the social 
harm domain. First, maintaining user anonymity is pivotal in such a domain, as it can have serious 
consequences with respect to safety and security of incident reporters. The name and email address 
of the users, if compromised, can jeopardize their well-being. Second, the reputation score builds 
over time and a malicious user may build a reputation through less sensitive crime reporting while 
misleading the system in the event of a high severity crime. It was for these reasons, that this thesis 
did not incorporate reputation model but used other crime-related attributes such as location, days 
and incident types to associate trust with the reported incidents. 
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2.5 Previous Work 
2.5.1 Community Data Analytics for Social Harm (CDASH) 
As an initial effort, we have created a distributed web application, CDASH [37], with the aim of 
not only predicting social harm hotspots but also allowing various stakeholders including law-
enforcement agencies, community organizations and citizens, to interact and report live social 
harm events to the system. A preliminary prototype accessible through desktops as well as hand-
held mobile devices is developed as presented in [37]. Key features of CDASH include: 
• Reporting live social harm events into the system. 
• Periodic prediction of social harm hotspots. 
• Dynamic communication of risks for efficient resource allocation. 
 
CDASH is developed using the principles of Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) where each 
system functionality was fulfilled by a self-sufficient service. It consists of a layered architecture 
as depicted in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: System Architecture of CDASH [37] 
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CDASH is built using the Model-View-Controller (MVC) software architectural pattern. 
Following layers are incorporated in CDASH. 
 
Presentation Layer: The Presentation Layer of CDASH consists of a C#-based Web Server 
(CWS). It helps in enhancing system interactivity by presenting social harm information in a user-
friendly manner. Two key components of the Presentation Layer are: 
• SignalR: One of the key requirements with CDASH is to provide an ability to enter live social 
harm events in the system. Also, with every police shift, hotspots were to be updated by the 
HPPS. With these aspects in consideration, CDASH required a mechanism for dynamically 
updating all the clients connected to it. This capability is provided by the SignalR module of 
C#. Whenever a client is connected to CDASH, it automatically joins a hub created and 
managed by SignalR. Through this hub, SignalR maintains a list of clients connected to the 
system. Whenever any update occurs in CDASH, all the connected clients are dynamically 
updated. Also, whenever a client is disconnected from the system, it is automatically removed 
from the hub’s notification list. SignalR implements the Observer software design pattern and 
ensures that the connected clients are always automatically updated with the most recent state 
of CDASH. 
• Static Contents and Live Map: Static contents help in enhancing the user’s experience while 
interacting with CDASH. It consists of HTML, Bootstrap, CSS and JavaScript along with its 
libraries (jQuery and AJAX). While HTML, Bootstrap and CSS help in enhancing the 
interactivity and user friendliness, JavaScript compliments the basic HTML functionalities 
along with providing a means for communicating with the web and application servers. Google 
maps are used to display hotspots and live incidents reported by the users. Any change in the 
state of CDASH is reflected dynamically on the live Google map. 
 
Middleware Layer: Fault tolerance is one of the major challenges faced by any large distributed 
system. In CDASH, it is important for the prediction service to consider each live incident entered 
into the system. In situations when the backend components (services in Application and/or 
Database Layers) are unresponsive, it is necessary to avoid the loss of live incidents reported to 
the system. This is achieved through Apache’s Kafka®. Kafka is a distributed queuing mechanism 
for receiving, storing and forwarding messages [38]. With CDASH, the Kafka Queuing Service 
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(KQS) is implemented using the publish-subscribe model. The Web Server behaves as a publisher, 
while the Application Server acts as the subscriber. The KQS holds live incidents, whenever 
backend is unresponsive, and forwards them automatically whenever the backend becomes 
responsive. Along with making the system fault tolerant, the KQS also ensures scaling of the 
CDASH system. 
 
Application Layer: The Application Layer holds the business logic of CDASH. As stated above, 
this layer acts as a subscriber for KQS. Additionally, it comprises of various services and 
components, which fulfill different functionalities in the system. This layer includes the following 
services: 
• Java-based Web Service (JWS): The JWS consists of various controller components, which 
are RESTful entry points for various functionalities into the system. All the user requests flow 
through the JWS towards the desired components and services thereby invoking the 
corresponding functionalities associated with the requests. 
• Duplication Handler: Duplication hander, as the name suggests, is a component that identifies 
the duplicity of live social harm events reported to CDASH. When a social harm occurs, it is 
possible that it gets reported by multiple people to the system. When the system receives a live 
incident, this component, based on time, location and the incident-type, evaluates the incident 
for a possible duplication. This is necessary to avoid any confusion with display of duplicate 
events on the map. 
• Hawkes Point Process Service (HPPS): The HPPS is a machine learning technique based on 
mathematical and statistical models as detailed in [5]. Written in MATLAB®, the HPPS is a 
self-exciting point process indicating the probability of occurrence of an event through an 
intensity function, based on the past events. It helps in modeling risks and forecasting trends 
in social harm. The risks are indicated in the form of social harm hotspots. These hotspots are 
geographic locations indicating high probabilities of certain social harm events occurring in 
near future. 
• Scheduler Service (SS): Over a period, the live incidents reported to CDASH become 
historical and are fed to the HPPS for generating new hotspots. It is important to consider that 
the hotspots do not change with every single live incident that is reported to the system. Thus, 
it is necessary to invoke the HPPS periodically. Currently, SS runs once in every 24 hours and 
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invokes the HPPS to generate new hotspots taking into consideration all the historical incidents 
along with the ones reported in the previous day. 
• Output Service (OS): Any change within the state of CDASH necessitates its reflection on 
the Google maps to keep the stakeholders updated. The OS helps in communicating these 
system changes to the Google map. Whenever, a change in the system state, such as an update 
of hotspots or reporting of live incident, occurs it is communicated to the Presentation Layer 
by the OS. 
 
Database Layer: CDASH stores and utilizes demographic data of various geographic locations 
in Indianapolis that are utilized by the HPPS in generating hotspots. The Database Layer consists 
of a MySQL database and a Database Service (DS) that helps the application layer in interacting 
with the database. The database also records all the reported live social harm events. This allows 
CDASH to interrelate and filter out duplicate events reported to the system. 
2.5.2 Experiments and Analyses with CDASH 
Heterogeneity: CDASH is designed to handle hardware heterogeneity. As stated, in section 2.5.1, 
it is developed to work with desktop browsers as well as mobile handheld devices. It ensures that 
CDASH is accessible to large spectrum of users. Figure 2.2 displays the desktop view provided by 
CDASH. 
 
Figure 2.2: Social Harm Information 
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Scalability: Scalability of CDASH is measured by analyzing the average response time for varying 
amounts of concurrent requests. Since the front-end (Presentation Layer) and back-end 
(Application and Database Layer) of the system are decoupled, the response-time of Presentation 
and Application Layers were measured and analyzed separately. To simulate real-world scenario, 
different loads of concurrent requests (maximum of 1000) were used in the scalability experiments. 
The response time of Presentation Layer was found to be in the range of 0.86 milliseconds to 1 
millisecond; while that for the Application Layer was found to be in the range of 29 milliseconds 
to 56 milliseconds - both these numbers are near real-time. With the Presentation Layer, it was 
observed that most of the time was taken for updating the map. With the Application Layer, JWS 
and DS took time to perform the business logic and persist data. Figure 2.3 depicts the performance 
CDASH achieved with various concurrent load of requests. 
 
Figure 2.3: Average Response Time of CDASH 
Fault Tolerance: With CDASH, fault tolerance is viewed with respect to three aspects: the CWS 
failure, the JWS or DS failure and the client failure. 
• CWS Failure: Whenever CWS fails, the point of contact with the system is lost and an 
appropriate message of unavailability is shown to the user. This situation requires restarting of 
the CWS.  
• JWS or DS Failure: When the JWS or DS fails, Kafka helps in achieving fault tolerance. 
Kafka holds the reported events in its server while the JWS or DS are unresponsive. Whenever 
the unresponsive components become available, Kafka automatically delivers the stored events 
for further processing. Additionally, two instances of JWS are configured to run in fault 
tolerant mode. Their synchronization is handled automatically by Kafka. 
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• Client Failure: In the event of the client failure, CDASH ensure that any event reported by 
the client is processed appropriately. Also, the client can see the most recent and updated view 
of the system once it reconnects with CDASH. 
 
Accuracy: To analyze the accuracy of CDASH, simulations were run using 2012-2013 social 
harm data of Indianapolis metro obtained from the IMPD. 18 different categories of social harm 
incidents as indicated in [5] were considered in this study. It was observed that CDASH captured 
20% of social harm cost in 2% of space-time. 
This initial prototype of CDASH forms the basis of this thesis. This initial design is enhanced 
further to include additional functionalities such as role-based access, recommendations, feedback 
features, and trust models. These enhancements are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
2.6 Summary 
As illustrated in this chapter, a lot of research work has been done in predicting crime or social 
harm incidents through various data mining and machine learning techniques. Also, there are 
applications, such as WikiCrimes [36], that allow reporting and analysis of live social harm 
incidents and associate trust with the reported incidents. However, limited work has been done in 
creating a comprehensive system that combines prediction of future social harm incidents while 
allowing users to report live incidents. Additionally, research has been conducted on exploring 
various ways of associating trust with live social harm incidents. However, merging the trust 
models into a comprehensive prediction system is needed – which is one of the goals of this thesis.   
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 PROPOSED APPROACH 
This chapter describes the proposed approach for creating a predictive system to mitigate social 
harm. In addition to presenting the design of the proposed system, the chapter discusses various 
datasets used as input to the system. The second part of the chapter focusses on estimating trust by 
proposing and comparing multiple trust models for real-time social harm events.  
3.1 Extension of CDASH Application 
The proposed predictive system, called T-CDASH, is shown in Figure 3.1. T-CDASH enhances 
the CDASH system [37] described in the previous chapter. The additional/enhanced services and 
components included in T-CDASH are highlighted in Figure 3.1 and discussed below. 
 
Figure 3.1: System Architecture of T-CDASH 
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Configuration Handler: The T-CDASH system comprises of various services that work together 
to fulfill functionalities provided by the system. Additionally, to make T-CDASH flexible, it is 
developed using the fundamentals of generative programming. With generative programming, it 
is possible to develop the system with a family of services that confirm to a defined interface. This 
allows a service to be selected at runtime. Thus, different services providing the same functionality 
can be a part of the system simultaneously. For example, currently T-CDASH has six different 
trust models including Ground-truth, Optimistic, Pessimistic, Random, Average and Opinion-
based model. In future, each of these models can be converted into a self-sufficient service. The 
Configuration Handler will allow one of those services to be invoked at runtime. Also, it will allow 
the system- administrators to modify the type of service to be invoked at runtime without restarting 
the T-CDASH system. 
 
Role Based Access Controller: Various stakeholders including the police department, community 
organizations, citizens and T-CDASH system-administrators interact with T-CDASH. This 
necessitated the use of role-based access for T-CDASH. It allows each stakeholder to view, access 
and interact only with the functionalities developed for the corresponding user. For example, 
currently, the police officers can view the live social harm events reported to T-CDASH along 
with the hotspots generated by T-CDASH. They are also displayed with hotspot-specific 
recommendations and can provide feedback regarding the actions taken while patrolling a hotspot. 
On the other hand, currently, citizens are only allowed to view the live social harm events reported 
to T-CDASH along with hotspots. 
 
Trust Service (TS): One of the important aspects of T-CDASH is that it allows various 
stakeholders to interact with it. Hence, it is possible that some rogue individuals or organizations 
will attempt to mislead the predictions by providing fake data to T-CDASH. Also, inaccuracies 
may occur while reporting data reported to T-CDASH due to selection of incorrect incident 
category. To avoid such erroneous situations, the TS is introduced in the T-CDASH. Every live 
incident is assigned a trust value in the system (discussed later). Depending on the trust value, a 
decision is made whether the incident should be considered for prediction of social harm hotspots 
or not. This decision is based on various factors which are explained in the Trust Management 
Section (Section 3.4). 
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Recommendation and Feedback Service (RFS): Two additional key functionalities provided by 
T-CDASH are: providing recommendations and gathering feedback from the IMPD police 
officers. Every police department, such as IMPD, divides the area under its jurisdiction into several 
beats for better management of its resources. Each police officer is assigned a beat (patrolling 
area). Each beat covers a certain geographical area and has certain hotspots flagged within it. 
Depending on the hotspots within the beat, a set of three recommendations are provided to the 
police officers. These three recommendations are customized for each hotspot and are based on 
the most desirable actions taken by the police officers while patrolling. However, sometimes, it is 
conceivable that the police officers may take other actions as demanded by the situation. This 
scenario requires a means to understand how frequently the recommendations will be accepted by 
the police officers. Thus, RFS service contains a mechanism to record whether the 
recommendations are helpful to the police officers or not. These tasks of creating and displaying 
recommendations and gathering feedback from police officers is handled by the RFS. 
 
Beats Service (BS): Currently, IMPD has divided the area of Marion County into 78 different 
beats. Officers police and patrol only within the beat assigned to them. Boundary-related 
information of these beats is stored in T-CDASH in the form of Keyhole Markup Language (KML) 
[39]. In future, the area and number of beats may change. Thus, it is necessary to allow these 
modifications seamlessly within T-CDASH. The Beats Service is created to store, retrieve and 
modify the information of beats under consideration. 
 
Map-Data Service (MDS): Any event occurring in T-CDASH must be reflected on the Google 
map to keep the stakeholders updated. MDS helps in communicating these updates to the map. 
Whenever, new events such as update of hotspots, report of events, display of recommendation or 
feedback from police officers occurs, the user-interaction with T-CDASH is handled by the MDS. 
This service is available in the earlier prototype as detailed in [37] under the name of Output 
Service (OS) and is renamed to indicate its functionality more appropriately. 
Also, the Database Layer of CDASH is modified to incorporate the above-mentioned 
functionalities. Table 3.1 presents the database schema for T-CDASH. 
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Table 3.1: Database Schema for T-CDASH 
Table Description 
HppsInput Stores the historical social harm incidents data, 
utilized by HPPS to generate social harm 
hotspots. 
HppsOutput Stores the hotspots generated by HPPS. 
Demography Stores the demographic information of various 
locations in the Marion county. This 
information is used by HPPS while generating 
hotspots. 
County Stores information related to a county 
including its name, KML and corresponding 
GeoJSON (A format for storing KML data). 
Beats Stores the name and geographical coordinates 
of beats. 
Live_Incidents Stores all the live events reported by various 
stakeholders of the system. 
Recommendations Stores three recommendations corresponding 
to each type of social harm incident. 
Feedback Stores the feedbacks provided by patrolling 
officer. 
Police_Beat Stores data that helps in identifying the beat 
assigned to police officers. 
Beat_Prediction_Count Stores information of hotspots along with their 
associated beat. 
Users Stores information of all the users registered 
with T-CDASH along with their roles. 
Access_Policies Stores the access policies associated with each 
role in T-CDASH. 
CAD Stores the CAD data provided by IMPD. 
RMS Stores the RMS data obtained from Socrata. 
UCR Stores the UCR data provided by IMPD. 
CADMapping Stores mappings to convert CAD incident 
types to T-CDASH incident types. 
RMSMapping Stores mappings to convert RMS incident 
types to T-CDASH incident types. 
UCRMapping Stores mappings to convert UCR incident 
types to T-CDASH incident types. 
 
Additional Features: 
• GeoJSON: GeoJSON is a format for displaying geographical features on maps [40]. It is an 
open standard based on JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format. In T-CDASH, two key 
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geographic features are identified: beats and hotpots. The geographic information related to 
beats is provided by the IMPD in the Shapefile format. Shapefile is a geospatial vector data 
format for representing geometric features such as points, lines and polygons stored in 
Geographic Information System (GIS) file format [41]. GIS files are created by governmental 
agencies for encoding geographical information [42]. Keyhole Markup Language (KML), 
developed by Google, is an XML-based notation for displaying and visualizing geographic 
information and features on maps [39]. Since it is easier to work with KML format than the 
encoded Shapefile format, the Shapefile is converted to KML using ArcGIS tool [43]. 
• Toggling Beats and Hotspots: One of the features required by the IMPD is an ability to toggle 
beats and hotspots on the map. This allows the patrolling officers to view either only the beat 
information or the hotspots information or both. This feature is achieved by providing a toggle 
button for beats and hotspots. 
• Beat-specific Hotspots: An important feature of T-CDASH is the beat-specific display of 
hotspots. Each patrolling police officer is assigned to a beat. It is necessary to display only the 
hotspots associated with the beat of the officer. The beat-specific hotspot display allows the 
officers to view and analyze hotspots only associated with their beat. 
3.2 System Flow 
3.2.1 Live Event Flow 
 
Figure 3.2: Live Event Flow 
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Figure 3.2 depicts the journey of a live event reported by a user. The user can report an incident 
through T-CDASH’s user interface, and the interface is immediately updated to reflect the reported 
incident. Simultaneously, the reported incident is passed on to the Kafka’s Queuing Service 
(KQS). Kafka forwards the incident information to the Java’s Web Service (JWS) as indicated in 
Figure 3.2. JWS first passes the incident to a Trust Service (TS) that assigns a certain degree of 
trust to the incident. Once a trust value is assigned, a decision is made to either process or ignore 
the reported incident. The incident is ignored if the belief (see the discussion in Section 3.4) 
associated with incident is below a certain predefined threshold value (a parameter that can be 
adjusted). Otherwise, the incident is enriched with the demographic information of the location 
where the incident occurred and is stored using the Database Service (DS). Currently, after every 
24 hours, a Scheduler Service (SS), automatically invokes the Hawkes Point Process Service 
(HPPS) – the HPPS is a machine learning service that helps in generating social harm hotspot. It 
fetches all the incidents stored in the database and generates the new hotspots, which are presented 
to the users.  
3.2.2 Recommendations Flow 
 
Figure 3.3: Recommendations Flow 
 
Figure 3.3 depicts the process of fetching recommendations for the patrolling police officers. Each 
police officer, as indicated earlier, is assigned to one patrolling beat. The officer is presented with 
the beat information along with the information of hotspots within it – currently, the top three 
hotspots (with respect to average cost) within the beat are displayed. Each hotspot represents top 
three type of incidents that are most likely to occur within the hotspot area. Depending on the 
hotspot’s incident types, recommendations are generated and presented to the officer. These 
recommendations suggest the most likely actions previously taken by the patrolling officers while 
patrolling for similar incidents. When an officer clicks on a hotspot, the information is passed on 
to the Recommendation and Feedback Service (RFS). The RFS invokes the DS for fetching a set 
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of top three recommendations depending on the hotspot information. These recommendations are 
then presented to the patrolling officer. 
3.2.3 Feedback Flow 
 
Figure 3.4: Feedback Flow 
 
Figure 3.4 displays the process of capturing feedback from the patrolling officers regarding the 
recommendations provided to them. Section 3.2.2 explains the process of providing hotspot-
specific recommendations to the police officers. Once the recommendations are provided, it is 
necessary to assess the usefulness of these recommendations to the police officers. Hence, T-
CDASH allows an interactive interface which enables the officers to select the list of 
recommendations they found to be useful and submit it to T-CDASH. The feedback is handled by 
the RFS which helps in storing the useful recommendations information along with the 
corresponding beat and hotspot information in the database. Figure 3.5 depicts the process of 
displaying recommendations and fetching feedback from police officers in real-time. 
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Figure 3.5: Recommendations and Feedback 
3.3 Social Harm Data 
As mentioned earlier, CAD, RMS and UCR datasets are made available by the IMPD. CAD and 
UCR records used in the analysis belong to years 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2016 while the RMS data 
of 2019 is available for analysis. An input data structure, containing data related to location and 
time of social harm along with demographic information of the area where the reported incident 
occurred, is created and fed to the HPPS. HPPS, in turn, generates social harm hotspots. For 
analyzing the trust framework, CAD, RMS and UCR data are preprocessed and interrelated 
(described later). Following is a brief description about the structure of CAD, RMS and UCR data. 
 
CAD Data: IMPD’s CAD data consists of various incidents reported to 911 call for service. It has 
the following schema (see Table 3.2). 
 
 
 
33 
 
Table 3.2: CAD Fields with Description 
Field Description 
RUNCODE A code for each type of incident reported. 
DESCRIPT A brief description about the reported incident. 
DISPDATE Date-time of the reported incident in 24-hour 
format (YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS format). 
IWDISPDATE Date of the reported incident (YYYYMMDD 
format). 
IWDISPTIME Time of the reported incident (HHMM 
format). 
LOCATION Physical address of the reported incident. 
XCOOR X-coordinate of the area of reported incident. 
YCOOR Y-coordinate of the area of reported incident. 
 
RMS Data: A report is generated by the IMPD whenever an incident is investigated. All these 
reports are stored in IMPD’s RMS. It has the following schema (see Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3: RMS Fields with Description 
Field Description 
NAT_OFF_CODE A unique national offence code for each type 
of recorded incident (Alpha-numeric format). 
NAT_OFF_CODE_DESCR A brief description about the recorded 
incident. 
OFFENSE_DATE Date-time of the recorded incident in 12-hour 
format (MM/DD/YYYY HH:MM:SS format). 
LATITUDE Latitude of the area of recorded incident. 
LONGITUDE Longitude of the area of recorded incident. 
 
RMS data is made available through Socrata [44]. Socrata is a Database-as-a-Service (DaaS) 
platform that helps in managing government data. Table 3.4 provides the schema of the RMS data 
obtained through Socrata. 
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Table 3.4: RMS Fields with Description obtained through Socrata 
Field Description 
incident_id A unique identifier associated with each 
recorded incident. 
case_number A unique case number associated with each 
recorded incident. 
incident_datetime Date and time of the recorded incident 
(MM/DD/YYYY HH:MM format). 
incident_type_primary Primary incident type of the recorded incident. 
incident_description A brief description about the recorded 
incident. 
address_1 Physical address of the incident. 
City City of the recorded incident. 
State State of the recorded incident. 
Latitude Latitude of the area of recorded incident. 
Longitude Longitude of the area of recorded incident. 
created_at Date and time the incident was recorded 
(MM/DD/YYYY HH:MM format). 
updated_at Date and time the incident was updated 
(MM/DD/YYYY HH:MM format). 
Location Geocoordinates of the recorded incident. 
hour_of_day Hour of the day when the incident occurred 
(24-hour format). 
day_of_week Day of the week when the incident occurred. 
parent_incident_type A generalized incident type, identifying 
multiple similar incident types, associated with 
the incident. 
 
UCR Data: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) collects, publishes, archives and maintains 
social harm records [28]. Most of the analysis on social harm is conducted using this data. It has 
the following schema (see Table 3.5). 
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Table 3.5: UCR Fields with Description 
Field Description 
PARTONE It identifies the severity of the crime. 
CODE A unique code for each type of recorded 
incident (Numeric format). 
TITLE A unique text description indicating the type of 
recorded incident. 
DATEOCC Date of the reported incident (MM/DD/YYYY 
format). 
TIMEOCC Time of the reported incident (HHMM format 
format). 
LOCATION Physical address of the reported incident. 
XCOOR X-coordinate of the area of reported incident. 
YCOOR Y-coordinate of the area of reported incident. 
 
3.3.1 Data Preprocessing 
As depicted in Tables 3.2 to 3.5, different social harm reporting and management systems store 
data in different formats, and each has their own schema. To analyze, interrelate, and process these 
records, it is necessary to convert them in a schema used by the HPPS. To achieve this, each record 
of CAD, RMS, and UCR is preprocessed so that it can be used with the HPPS. 
For CAD, the descriptions entered by 911 officials closely resembled to the type of incident 
that was reported. Thus, pattern matching was carried out on these event descriptions to map the 
CAD records into the corresponding HPPS input format. For this, a pattern which closely 
resembled a given type of incident (e.g., AGG for Aggravated Assault) was chosen and all the 
records with this pattern in their description (AGG pattern in this example) were mapped to a 
particular incident code for the HPPS input (Aggravated Assault in this example). With the CAD 
data set, it is important to note that when a social harm is reported to 911 and recorded in CAD, it 
is an initial assumption about the harm and the actual harm type is not known until later. Thus, the 
mappings are based on assumptions that the description is a correct reflection of the actual incident. 
However, this may not be always true. For example, in 2015, an incident reported as assault in 
CAD was found to be robbery post investigation. 
Table 3.6 indicates the patterns used in the CAD descriptions and the corresponding HPPS 
input incident mapped – these mappings were carried out in consultation with Dr. Jeremy Carter, 
Associate Dean for Research, Director of Criminal Justice and Public Safety at IUPUI.  
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Table 3.6: Mapping CAD Descriptions to CDASH Incidents 
CAD Description Pattern CDASH Incident Code 
AGG Aggravated Assault 
SHOT Aggravated Assault 
STRUCK Aggravated Assault 
GUN Aggravated Assault 
FIRED Aggravated Assault 
KNIFE Aggravated Assault 
ARSON Arson 
FIRE  Arson 
DUI DWI Arrest 
DWI DWI Arrest 
FAKE Forgery 
FORG Forgery 
CARD Fraud 
FRAUD Fraud 
HOMI Homicide 
PURSE Larceny 
SHOPL Larceny 
LARC Larceny 
THEF Larceny 
WALLET Larceny 
VEH Motor Vehicle Theft 
MOLEST Rape 
RAPE Rape 
SEX Rape 
APT Residential Burglary 
BURG Residential Burglary 
RESD Residential Burglary 
RSD Residential Burglary 
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Table 3.6 continued 
ROBB Robbery 
ASSAL Simple Assault 
ASSAU Simple Assault 
ASSL Simple Assault 
FIGHT Simple Assault 
SUIC Suicide Attempt 
DAM Vandalism 
GRAF Vandalism 
VAND Vandalism 
 
Similarly, the UCR records are also mapped to the corresponding HPPS input format. Since, UCR 
data is streamlined, they are mapped to the HPPS inputs using unique UCR codes. Table 3.7 
indicates the UCR codes along with the harm title that it represents and the corresponding HPPS 
input incident. 
 
Table 3.7: Mapping UCR Codes to CDASH Incidents 
UCR Code UCR Title CDASH Code 
170 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT-GUN Aggravated Assault 
171 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT-KNIFE Aggravated Assault 
172 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT-OTHER 
WEAPON 
Aggravated Assault 
173 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT-HANDS,FISTS Aggravated Assault 
329 ARSON-OTHER-
CROPS/TIMBR/FENCS/SIGNS 
Arson 
328 ARSON-OTHR 
MOBILE,TRAILRS,RECVEH,PLANES 
Arson 
327 ARSON-MOTOR 
VEHICLES/CARS/TRUCKS/BUSES 
Arson 
326 ARSON-ALL OTHER STRUCTURES Arson 
325 ARSON-COMMUNITY/PUBLIC-
JAIL,HOSP,SCHOOL 
Arson 
324 ARSON-OTHR 
COMMERCIAL,STORE,RESTRNT,OFFICE 
Arson 
323 ARSON-INDUSTRIAL, 
MANUFACTURING 
Arson 
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Table 3.7 continued 
322 ARSON-
STORAGE,GARAGE,BARN,WAREHOUSE 
Arson 
321 ARSON-OTHR 
RES,APTS,MOTEL,DORMS,BOARDING 
Arson 
320 ARSON-SINGLE OCCUPANCY, 
RESIDENTIAL ETC 
Arson 
690 DWI ARREST DWI Arrest 
332 FORGERY INVESTIGATION Forgery 
330 FORGERY – CHECK Forgery 
355 FRAUD – WELFARE Fraud 
354 FRAUD – PRESCRIPTION Fraud 
353 FRAUD – OTHER Fraud 
351 FRAUD - CREDIT CARD/ATM Fraud 
350 FRAUD – IMPERSONATION Fraud 
352 FRAUD – CHECK Fraud 
358 FRAUD - BAD CHECK Fraud 
357 FRAUD - IDENTITY THEFT Fraud 
356 FRAUD – WIRE Fraud 
110 CRIMINAL HOMICIDE Homicide 
243 LARCENY- FROM MOTOR VEHICLE Larceny 
256 LARCENY-UNDER 50-FROM BUILDING Larceny 
231 LARCENY-OVER 200-PURSESNATCH Larceny 
232 LARCENY-OVER 200-SHOPLIFTING Larceny 
233 LARCENY-OVER 200-FROM AUTO Larceny 
234 LARCENY-OVER 200-AUTO 
ACCESSORY 
Larceny 
235 LARCENY-OVER 200-BICYCLE Larceny 
257 LARCENY-UNDER 50-COIN OPERATED 
MACH 
Larceny 
236 LARCENY-OVER 200-FROM BUILDING Larceny 
237 LARCENY-OVER 200-COIN OPERATED 
MACH 
Larceny 
238 LARCENY-OVER 200-OTHER Larceny 
240 LARCENY-50 TO 200-POCKETPICKING Larceny 
241 LARCENY-50 TO 200-PURSESNATCH Larceny 
230 LARCENY-OVER 200-POCKETPICKING Larceny 
229 LARCENY-ATTEMPT Larceny 
242 LARCENY-50 TO 200-SHOPLIFTING Larceny 
258 LARCENY-UNDER 50-OTHER Larceny 
360 EMBEZZLEMENT Larceny 
244 LARCENY-50 TO 200-AUTO 
ACCESSORY 
Larceny 
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Table 3.7 continued 
245 LARCENY-50 TO 200-BICYCLE Larceny 
246 LARCENY-50 TO 200-FROM BUILDING Larceny 
247 LARCENY-50 TO 200-COIN OPERATED 
MACH 
Larceny 
248 LARCENY-50 TO 200-OTHER Larceny 
250 LARCENY-UNDER 50-POCKETPICKING Larceny 
251 LARCENY-UNDER 50-PURSESNATCH Larceny 
252 LARCENY-UNDER 50-SHOPLIFTING Larceny 
253 LARCENY-UNDER 50-FROM AUTO Larceny 
254 LARCENY-UNDER 50-AUTO 
ACCESSORY 
Larceny 
255 LARCENY-UNDER 50-BICYCLE Larceny 
263 RECOVERED VEHICLE STOLEN OJ Motor Vehicle Theft 
260 VEHICLE THEFT Motor Vehicle Theft 
259 ATTEMPT VEHICLE THEFT Motor Vehicle Theft 
122 SEX MISCONDUCT-MINOR Rape 
123 FORCIBLE FONDLING Rape 
120 RAPE Rape 
210 BURG-ATTEMPT-RES NIGHT Residential Burglary 
191 BURG-FORCIBLE ENT-RES DAY Residential Burglary 
201 BURG-NO FORCE-RES DAY Residential Burglary 
200 BURG-NO FORCE-RES NIGHT Residential Burglary 
190 BURG-FORCIBLE ENT-RES NIGHT Residential Burglary 
211 BURG-ATTEMPT-RES DAY Residential Burglary 
140 ROBBERY-ARMED-HIWAY Robbery 
133 ATTEMPT STRONG ARMED ROBBERY Robbery 
132 ATTEMPT ARMED ROBBERY Robbery 
155 ROBBERY-STRONG ARM-BANK Robbery 
154 ROBBERY-STRONG ARM-RESIDENCE Robbery 
153 ROBBERY-STRONG ARM-CHAIN STORE Robbery 
152 ROBBERY-STRONG ARM-OIL STATION Robbery 
151 ROBBERY-STRONG ARM-
COMMERCIAL HSE 
Robbery 
150 ROBBERY-STRONG ARM-HIWAY Robbery 
146 ROBBERY-ARMED-MISCELLANEOUS Robbery 
145 ROBBERY-ARMED-BANK Robbery 
142 ROBBERY-ARMED-OIL STATION Robbery 
143 ROBBERY-ARMED-CHAIN STORE Robbery 
144 ROBBERY-ARMED-RESIDENCE Robbery 
141 ROBBERY-ARMED-COMMERCIAL 
HOUSE 
Robbery 
156 ROBBERY-STRONG ARM-
MISCELLANEOUS 
Robbery 
174 ASSAULT-SIMPLE Simple Assault 
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Table 3.7 continued 
663 SUICIDE ATTEMPT Suicide Attempt 
603 VANDALISM Vandalism 
 
Lastly, the RMS records maintained by the IMPD are also analyzed and mapped to HPPS inputs. 
Similar to the UCR data, the RMS data is also streamlined. For RMS, incident descriptions closely 
resemble the type of incident and are used for generating the mapping. Table 3.8 provides a 
mapping between various RMS incident descriptions and the corresponding HPPS input incident. 
 
Table 3.8: Mapping RMS Incidents to CDASH Incidents 
RMS Incident Descriptions CDASH Code 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT Aggravated Assault 
ALL OTHER LARCENY Larceny 
ARSON Arson 
ARSON INVESTIGATION Arson 
ATTEMPTED BURGLARY Residential Burglary 
ATTEMPTED OR THREATENING 
SUICIDE 
Suicide Attempt 
ATTEMPTED ROBBERY Robbery 
BURGLARY IN-PROGRESS Residential Burglary 
BURGLARY INVESTIGATION Residential Burglary 
BURGLARY/BREAKING AND 
ENTERING 
Residential Burglary 
COUNTERFEITING/FORGERY Forgery 
CREDIT CARD/AUTOMATIC TELLER 
MACHINE FRAUD 
Fraud 
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY Vandalism 
DEATH INVESTIGATION- SUICIDE Suicide Attempt 
DESTRUCTION/DAMAGE/VANDALISM 
OF PROPERTY 
Vandalism 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE DWI Arrest 
EMBEZZLEMENT Larceny 
FALSE 
PRETENSES/SWINDLE/CONFIDENCE 
GAME 
Fraud 
FIGHT Simple Assault 
FIGHT WITH WEAPON Aggravated Assault 
FIRE INVESTIGATION Arson 
FORCIBLE RAPE Rape 
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Table 3.8 continued 
FORGERY INVESTIGATION Forgery 
FRAUD INVESTIGATION Fraud 
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT Motor Vehicle Theft 
MURDER AND NONNEGLIGENT 
MANSLAUGHTER 
Homicide 
PERSON ASSAULTED Simple Assault 
PERSON INJURED Simple Assault 
PERSON SHOT Aggravated Assault 
PERSON STABBED Aggravated Assault 
POCKET/PICKING Larceny 
PROPERTY DAMAGE (NON-CRIMINAL 
EVENT) 
Vandalism 
PURSE-SNATCHING Larceny 
ROBBERY Robbery 
ROBBERY IN-PROGRESS Robbery 
ROBBERY INVESTIGATION Robbery 
SHOPLIFTING Larceny 
SHOPLIFTING INVESTIGATION Larceny 
SIMPLE ASSAULT Simple Assault 
STOLEN VEHICLE Motor Vehicle Theft 
SUICIDE Suicide Attempt 
SUICIDE- ATTEMPTED Suicide Attempt 
THEFT FROM BUILDING Larceny 
VANDALISM Vandalism 
 
3.3.2 Data Interrelationship 
Trust is an important aspect associated with T-CDASH. As detailed in Section 2.4, to maintain 
reporter’s anonymity and to avoid misuse of reporter’s historical reputation, this thesis focused on 
using Jøsang’s opinion model [33] in a similar way as utilized by Ceolin et al. [34]. Through 
opinion model, a certain degree of trust is assigned to each live incident reported to T-CDASH. 
This trust is based on three key components that gets associated with the reported event: belief (b), 
disbelief (d) and uncertainty (u). Section 2.4 presents the mathematical formulae for computing 
the belief, disbelief and uncertainty. These calculations are based on the number of positive 
evidences, negative evidences, and total evidences that the system has with respect to the reported 
live incident. In T-CDASH, to gather these evidences, three key aspects associated with social 
harm incidents, are taken into consideration. 
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Location: Geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude) of the location where the reported 
incident occurred. 
Day: Date (day and month) on which the reported incident occurred. 
Incident Type: The type of the reported incident. 
 
Based on these three aspects, reported live incident can be interrelated with historical social 
harm incidents. The interrelated incidents act as evidences for the reported live incident. 
For computing the total evidences, two aspects, location and/or day, are considered. With location, 
we consider a circular range of 110 m (or three decimal places accuracy with respect to latitude 
and longitude [45]) around the reported incident. All the historical social harm incidents within 
this range are assumed to contribute towards total evidence. Similarly, historical social harm 
incidents, which had occurred within a range of days (4 to 7 days) before or after the reported 
incident’s day, in the same month from previous years, also contribute towards the total evidences. 
These ranges are selected to allow a small buffer with respect to location and day while collecting 
evidences from the historical data. T-CDASH is made configurable to allow either location or day 
or both the attributes to contribute towards total evidences. 
For positive evidences, the incident type of the incidents that contributed towards the total 
evidence are considered. All the incidents contributing towards total evidence that have the same 
incident type as that of the current live incident, act as positive evidences for the live incident. 
Thus, interrelating the live incident with historical social harm incidents, we are able to associate 
certain degree of trust with any live incident. 
3.4 Trust Management 
Due to the presence of many stakeholders (e.g., community organizations and citizens) in T-
CDASH, there is a need to manage the trust associated with their interactions with T-CDASH. 
Any malicious or incorrect interaction with T-CDASH may affect the hotspot predictions. One 
way of ensuring and maintaining the accuracy of predictions is to process and filter out live user-
inputs (especially from users such as community organizations and citizens) before they are 
considered for generating hotspots. This processing and filtering stage helps in assigning a trust 
value to each live interaction – thus, six trust models are created, and their efficacies are compared. 
These models are:  
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Ground-truth Model: In this model, all the inputs are assumed to be trustworthy and passed to 
the HPPS service. No additional processing is done on the inputs. Since, everything is trusted, this 
model may not perform well while dealing with misleading inputs and filtering them out. Thus, 
the accuracy of predicting hotspots, obtained via this model, may not be acceptable.  
 
Optimistic Model: The Optimistic model considers a high percentage (80% to 90%) of all the live 
user-inputs (randomly chosen) to be trustworthy and passes them to the HPPS service. In this 
model, remaining inputs (10% to 20%) are simply ignored. Since most of the inputs are accepted 
by this model, it is possible that a high percentage of misleading inputs may contribute towards 
the hotspot generation. Thus, similar to the Ground-truth Model, this model may also result in 
incorrect predictions.  
 
Pessimistic Model: It is opposite of the Optimistic model. Here, only a small percentage (10% to 
20%) of all the live user-inputs (randomly chosen) are considered to be trustworthy and passed on 
to the HPPS service. Remaining inputs (80% to 90%) are simply ignored. Since most of the user 
inputs are ignored, it is safe to assume that most of the misleading inputs will be filtered out from 
the prediction process. However, as only a smaller percentage of inputs are considered in the 
prediction process, it is also possible that many genuine inputs are ignored. This may negatively 
impact the accuracy of hotspots generated by this model.  
 
Average Model: In this model, half of all the live user-inputs (randomly chosen) are considered 
as trustworthy and passed on to the HPPS service. The remaining half are ignored. Since half of 
the inputs are randomly chosen and ignored, this model may serve better with considering genuine 
inputs while ignoring misleading ones as compared to the Optimistic and Pessimistic models. 
However, since processing is random, accuracy of the system would still be questionable. 
 
Random Model: In this model, a set of live user-inputs are randomly chosen in the process of 
hotspots generation; others are ignored. This model presents a baseline scenario and can be used 
in situations when historical data is not available to train HPPS. Again, like the average model, the 
processing is random and thus, the prediction accuracy would remain indeterminate. 
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Opinion-based Model: In all the above models, none of the event attributes are taken into 
consideration while selecting or ignoring the live user-inputs. The Opinion-based model selects or 
rejects the live inputs based on the trust tuple made up of belief (b), disbelief (d) and uncertainty 
(u) values. The b, d and u values are computed in two ways by this model. One method, named 
Random, randomly assigns values to b, d and u while the other method, named Heuristic, utilizes 
the interrelation created between live and historical data, as discussed in Section 3.3.2. Since, 
Random method of this model randomly assigns values, the model accuracy with Random method 
would be indeterminate. The Heuristic method of this model, however, is based on actual event 
attributes and its interrelation with historical incidents. Thus, it is expected to perform the best in 
comparison with all the other models. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has described various processing and interrelationship operations performed on the 
CAD, RMS and UCR records. The chapter also describes the trust framework with various trust 
models for associating trust with the social harm events. The following chapter describes and 
discusses the results obtained by performing various experiments with these trust models with 
different sets of social harm data. 
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 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This chapter discusses various experiments performed to empirically validate the accuracy of 
different trust models proposed within the trust framework of T-CDASH to assign a degree of trust 
with each social harm incident. This thesis uses real-world CAD, RMS and UCR data for 
experimentation. 
4.1 Assumptions 
Various experiments are performed on the trust models to analyze their performance. All these 
experiments are performed under certain assumptions which are as follows: 
• All the post investigation social harm records (RMS and UCR records) are assumed to be 
completely trustworthy. 
• The location and date-time recorded for all social harm records in each source (CAD, RMS 
and UCR) are assumed to correctly reflect the actual location and date-time for the incident. 
• It is assumed that the description recorded for an incident reported in CAD is a correct 
reflection of the actual incident. 
• It is also assumed that the conversion of RMS records to UCR records as performed by the 
law-enforcement agencies is achieved without any errors or misinterpretations. 
4.2 Training the Prediction Service 
Before comparing the trust models, it is important to train the hotspot prediction service (HPPS). 
Since the UCR data is highly trustworthy, the HPPS is trained on the UCR data. Also, real-time 
data is required to test the trust models. Since the CAD data is a real-time reporting of social harm 
incidents, the CAD records are considered for evaluating the trust models. 
A baseline model having accurate predictions is required to compare the performance of 
trust models. Accurate predictions are generated using completely trustworthy data. This thesis 
considers the UCR and RMS data to be completely trustworthy. Also, it is necessary to consider 
all the UCR (available for 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2016) or RMS (available for 2019) records for 
generating accurate hotspots. Thus, the Ground-truth model is chosen to be the baseline model 
with the UCR or RMS data. As stated earlier, the CAD records are reported in real-time and prone 
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to errors. Thus, they mimic the live incidents that will be fed to T-CDASH. With this in 
consideration, the CAD records are fed to models (other than the Ground-truth model) and hotspots 
generated by them are compared with the hotspots generated by the Ground-truth model. Multiple 
iterations are performed while comparing the models. Each iteration consists of data belonging to 
a particular month of the testing period. 
4.3 Experiments with Trust Framework 
In the experiments performed, the Ground-truth model acts as a baseline model and the accuracy 
of all the other models (termed as test models) is defined in terms of hotspots matching percentage. 
The hotspots matching percentage is the percentage of hotspots, generated by a model, that match 
(have the same location and incident type) with the hotspots generated by the Ground-truth model. 
Additionally, for all the experiments, two time series data cross validation techniques: Rolling 
Windows and Rolling Origin are applied to analyze their impact on the accuracy of trust models. 
 
Rolling Windows: Rolling Windows technique considers multiple origins but maintains a fixed 
training data size by eliminating oldest records in each iteration. 
 
Rolling Origin: Rolling Origin technique considers multiple origins by increasing the training 
data size in each iteration. 
4.3.1 Experiments with 2012 – 2013 Data 
This section depicts the results obtained by training the HPPS service on UCR data of 2012-2013 
while evaluating the trust models through the CAD and UCR data of 2013. 
Optimistic Model: With Optimistic model, three different percentages, 80, 90 and 95, of inputs 
are considered trustworthy. On an average, the matching percentage was 35.97. 
Pessimistic Model: With Pessimistic model, three different percentages, 5, 10 and 20, of inputs 
are considered trustworthy. On an average, the matching percentage was 48.29. 
Average Model: With Average model, it is expected that the hotspots matching percentage will 
be approximately the average of the matching percentages of the Optimistic and Pessimistic 
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models. In this model, 50 percent of inputs are considered trustworthy. On an average, the 
matching percentage was 41.10, which is as expected. 
Random Model: The Random model is non-deterministic as it randomly considers a set of inputs 
to be trustworthy. On an average, the matching percentage was 42.23. 
The experimental results for the above test models are summarized in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Performance of Test Models with 2012-2013 Data 
Model System Inputs 
Allowed (%) 
Hotspots Matched 
(%) 
Optimistic Rolling Windows 80 37.46 
Optimistic Rolling Windows 90 36.98 
Optimistic Rolling Windows 95 36.33 
Optimistic Rolling Origin 80 35.60 
Optimistic Rolling Origin 90 34.93 
Optimistic Rolling Origin 95 34.54 
Pessimistic Rolling Windows 5 49.66 
Pessimistic Rolling Windows 10 47.94 
Pessimistic Rolling Windows 20 46.46 
Pessimistic Rolling Origin 5 49.02 
Pessimistic Rolling Origin 10 48.53 
Pessimistic Rolling Origin 20 45.14 
Average Rolling Windows 50 42.93 
Average Rolling Origin 50 39.28 
Random Rolling Windows Random 42.85 
Random Rolling Origin Random 41.62 
 
Opinion-based Model: In Opinion-based model, as stated in chapter 3, two methods (Random 
and Heuristic) are used to assign values to b, d and u. In Random method, if the randomly generated 
belief value for an incident is above a chosen threshold belief value, the incident is considered for 
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generating hotspots. Similarly, if the randomly generated disbelief value for an incident is above 
a chosen threshold disbelief value, the incident is ignored. In all other scenarios, the trust on the 
incident is uncertain and it is either considered or ignored randomly. In Heuristic method, data 
interrelationship, as detailed in chapter 3 of this thesis, is considered for assigning values to b, d 
and u. Table 4.2 depicts the percentage of hotspots matched between the hotspots computed by the 
two methods of Opinion-based model and the Ground-truth model while considering different 
threshold percentages of belief and disbelief. On an average, the matching percentage of Random 
method was 40.63 and Heuristic method was 47.59. 
Table 4.2: Performance of Opinion-based Model with 2012-2013 Data 
Method System Is Location 
Accounted? 
Is Day 
Accounted? 
Belief 
Threshold 
(%) 
Disbelief 
Threshold 
(%) 
Hotspots 
Matched 
(%) 
Random Rolling 
Windows 
No No 50 50 42.03 
 
Random Rolling 
Origin 
No No 50 50 39.24 
Heuristic Rolling 
Windows 
Yes Yes 50 50 49.47 
Heuristic Rolling 
Windows 
Yes No 50 50 49.59 
Heuristic Rolling 
Windows 
No Yes 50 50 48.18 
Heuristic Rolling 
Windows 
Yes Yes 70 50 47.90 
Heuristic Rolling 
Windows 
Yes Yes 50 70 46.53 
Heuristic Rolling 
Windows 
Yes Yes 80 80 46.06 
Heuristic Rolling 
Windows 
Yes Yes 10 10 46.73 
Heuristic Rolling 
Windows 
Yes Yes 30 30 49.82 
Heuristic Rolling 
Origin 
Yes Yes 50 50 48.33 
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Table 4.2 continued 
Heuristic Rolling 
Origin 
Yes No 50 50 48.81 
Heuristic Rolling 
Origin 
No Yes 50 50 47.42 
Heuristic Rolling 
Origin 
Yes Yes 70 50 46.98 
Heuristic Rolling 
Origin 
Yes Yes 50 70 45.64 
Heuristic Rolling 
Origin 
Yes Yes 80 80 45.17 
Heuristic Rolling 
Origin 
Yes Yes 10 10 45.87 
Heuristic Rolling 
Origin 
Yes Yes 30 30 49.03 
 
4.3.2 Experiments with 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2016 Data 
This section describes the results obtained by training the HPPS service on UCR data from 2012-
2013 and 2015-2016 years while evaluating the trust models through the CAD and UCR data of 
2015-2016. 
Optimistic Model: With Optimistic model, 80 percent of inputs are considered trustworthy. 
Pessimistic Model: With Pessimistic model, 20 percent of inputs are considered trustworthy. 
Average Model: With Average model, 50 percent of inputs are considered trustworthy. 
Random Model: The Random model randomly considers a set of inputs to be trustworthy. 
The experimental results for the above models are summarized in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: Performance of Test Models with 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2016 Data 
Model System Training 
Year 
Testing 
Year 
Inputs 
Allowed (%) 
Hotspots 
Matched (%) 
Optimistic Rolling 
Windows 
2015-
2016 
2016 80 38.02 
Optimistic Rolling Origin 2015-
2016 
2016 80 37.59 
Optimistic Rolling 
Windows 
2012-
2013 
2015 80 23.39 
Optimistic Rolling Origin 2012-
2013 
2015 80 21.64 
Optimistic Rolling 
Windows 
2012-
2013 
2016 80 20.41 
Optimistic Rolling Origin 2012-
2013 
2016 80 19.28 
Pessimistic Rolling 
Windows 
2015-
2016 
2016 20 48.53 
Pessimistic Rolling Origin 2015-
2016 
2016 20 49.11 
Pessimistic Rolling 
Windows 
2012-
2013 
2015 20 25.53 
Pessimistic Rolling Origin 2012-
2013 
2015 20 23.57 
Pessimistic Rolling 
Windows 
2012-
2013 
2016 20 26.28 
Pessimistic Rolling Origin 2012-
2013 
2016 20 26.19 
Average Rolling 
Windows 
2015-
2016 
2016 50 42.87 
Average Rolling Origin 2015-
2016 
2016 50 41.45 
Average Rolling 
Windows 
2012-
2013 
2015 50 25.06 
Average Rolling Origin 2012-
2013 
2015 50 25.39 
Average Rolling 
Windows 
2012-
2013 
2016 50 25.81 
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Table 4.3 continued 
Average Rolling Origin 2012-
2013 
2016 50 24.86 
Random Rolling 
Windows 
2015-
2016 
2016 Random 41.86 
Random Rolling Origin 2015-
2016 
2016 Random 40.93 
Random Rolling 
Windows 
2012-
2013 
2015 Random 25.16 
Random Rolling Origin 2012-
2013 
2015 Random 23.72 
Random Rolling 
Windows 
2012-
2013 
2016 Random 19.85 
Random Rolling Origin 2012-
2013 
2016 Random 21.94 
 
Opinion-based Model: With both Random and Heuristic methods of the Opinion-based model, 
the belief and disbelief thresholds are chosen to be at 50 percent. Also, with Heuristic method the 
location and day parameters are considered while generating evidences. The experimental results 
for the Opinion-based model is summarized in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Performance of Opinion-based Model with 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2016 Data 
Method System Train-
ing 
Year 
Test-
ing 
Year 
Is 
Location 
Account-
ed? 
Is Day 
Account-
ed 
? 
Belief 
Thres-
hold 
(%) 
Disbe-
lief 
Thres
-hold 
(%) 
Hotspots 
Matched 
(%) 
Random Rolling 
Windows 
2015-
2016 
2016 No No 50 50 42.59 
Random Rolling 
Origin 
2015-
2016 
2016 No No 50 50 41.64 
Random Rolling 
Windows 
2012-
2013 
2015 No No 50 50 24.79 
Random Rolling 
Origin 
2012-
2013 
2015 No No 50 50 21.35 
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Table 4.4 continued 
Random Rolling 
Windows 
2012-
2013 
2016 No No 50 50 22.64 
Random Rolling 
Origin 
2012-
2013 
2016 No No 50 50 22.06 
Heuristic Rolling 
Windows 
2015-
2016 
2016 Yes Yes 50 50 51.73 
Heuristic 
 
Rolling 
Origin 
2015-
2016 
2016 Yes Yes 50 50 49.28 
Heuristic Rolling 
Windows 
2012-
2013 
2015 Yes Yes 50 50 28.59 
Heuristic 
 
Rolling 
Origin 
2012-
2013 
2015 Yes Yes 50 50 26.43 
Heuristic Rolling 
Windows 
2012-
2013 
2016 Yes Yes 50 50 27.58 
Heuristic 
 
Rolling 
Origin 
2012-
2013 
2016 Yes Yes 50 50 24.93 
 
4.3.3 Experiments with RMS Data 
This section details the results obtained by training the HPPS service on the UCR data of 2015-
2016 while evaluating the trust models through the RMS data of first five months of 2019. Since, 
the CAD data for 2019 is not available, simulated CAD data for first five months of 2019 is 
generated based on the UCR and CAD data of 2016 (most recent CAD and UCR data available). 
On analyzing the CAD and UCR data of 2016, it is observed that approximately 67% of CAD data 
is reflected in the UCR records. Based on this, simulated CAD records matching with 67% RMS 
data is generated. The remaining 33% of CAD records are simulated randomly from UCR records 
of 2016. For these experiments, the configuration of trust models is same as the configuration used 
in section 4.2.2. However, it is important to note that since real-world CAD and UCR records are 
not available for 2019, it is difficult to compare the results with the results obtained from other 
experiments. 
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Table 4.5 depicts the performance of Optimistic, Pessimistic, Random and Average Models. 
Table 4.6 portrays the performance of Opinion-based model. 
Table 4.5: Performance of Test Models with RMS Data 
Model System Inputs 
Allowed (%) 
Hotspots Matched 
(%) 
Optimistic Rolling Windows 80 48.96 
Optimistic Rolling Origin 80 46.34 
Pessimistic Rolling Windows 20 36.60 
Pessimistic Rolling Origin 20 37.12 
Average Rolling Windows 50 43.58 
Average Rolling Origin 50 42.07 
Random Rolling Windows Random 46.60 
Random Rolling Origin Random 43.28 
 
Table 4.6: Performance of Opinion-based Model with RMS Data 
Method System Is Location 
Accounted? 
Is Day 
Accounted? 
Belief 
Threshold 
(%) 
Disbelief 
Threshold 
(%) 
Hotspots 
Matched 
(%) 
Random Rolling 
Windows 
No No 50 50 44.33 
Random Rolling 
Origin 
No No 50 50 42.83 
Heuristic Rolling 
Windows 
Yes Yes 50 50 30.66 
Heuristic Rolling 
Origin 
Yes Yes 50 50 31.47 
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4.4 Observations and Analyses 
4.4.1 Best Model 
From Tables 4.1 to 4.4, it can be seen that the Pessimistic model performs best when compared to 
all the other models. The Pessimistic model is followed by the Opinion-based model with the 
Heuristic method, the Average model, and lastly the Optimistic model in that order of hotspots 
matching percentages. Since the performance of the Random model and the Random method of 
Opinion-based model are indeterminate, it may not be appropriate to compare them directly with 
other models. However, the matching percentage of the hotspots generated by them are close to 
that of the Average model. One reason for such hotspot matching behavior is due to the fact that 
many incidents reported to the CAD are not reported in the UCR in the same way. This is because 
the incident may have never occurred or after investigation, it was found that some incident other 
than the actual one was reported. For example, an incident of Simple Assault was reported in CAD. 
However, during the investigation, it was found that it was a case of Homicide. Another reason is 
that many incidents are investigated directly by the IMPD without ever being reported in CAD. 
Thus, CAD and UCR records differ considerably. This justifies the fact that models considering 
smaller percentages of CAD data for generating hotspots present higher hotspot matching 
accuracy. These experiments highlight that more the number of inputs ignored, higher is the 
hotspot match percentage. Accordingly, both the Pessimistic model and the Opinion-based model 
with the Heuristic method have the highest match percentages. However, it may not be always 
advisable to ignore a large percentage of inputs. Consider a scenario where a critical live incident 
is reported. Since both models ignore most of the inputs, even multiple reports by different users 
reporting the critical incident may get ignored. This may negatively impact the predictions 
generated by the system. It is also important to note that both the Pessimistic model and the 
Opinion-based model with the Heuristic method have approximately equal hotspot matching 
percentages. Since, the Opinion-based model with the Heuristic method takes a more informed 
decision while considering or ignoring inputs for generating predictions rather than deciding 
randomly (e.g., the Pessimistic model), it is considered better when compared to the Pessimistic 
model. 
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4.4.2 Seasonal Performance of Models 
All the experiments are performed on the monthly data of the testing period and then averaged out 
over the entire year. The hotspots generated for each month are analyzed and compared. A 
significant observation is that the hotspot match percentage remained close to the average value 
without displaying any drastic deviations in any month of the year. Thus, a key insight with these 
experiments is that the performance of various trust models is agnostic from seasonal changes that 
may occur in social harms occurring in the society. 
4.4.3 Effect of Data Cross Validation 
As stated earlier, two cross validation techniques for the time series data: Rolling Origin and 
Rolling Windows are used in the experiments. The difference between the techniques is that the 
Rolling Origin method considers all the records while generating predictions while the Rolling 
Windows method eliminates the oldest records. The result of the experiments performed with both 
techniques are depicted in Tables 4.1 to 4.6. Tashman in [29] indicated that pruning of old records 
may be unnecessary if the prediction service considers data in a weighted manner, mitigating the 
influence of any data from distant past. The HPPS service generating hotspots in T-CDASH 
considers data in a weighted manner. The experiments indicate that the matching percentages 
remain almost the same no matter which cross validation technique is used. This thesis thus 
confirms to the observations presented by Tashman in [29]. 
4.4.4 Effect of Time Intervals between Training and Testing Data 
Sections 4.1.1 and 4.2.2 depict experiments involving data from various training and testing years. 
In particular, the experiments involve four combinations of yearly data for training and testing the 
trust models as depicted in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7: Training and Testing Years for Evaluating Trust Models 
Training Year Testing Year 
2012-2013 2013 
2015-2016 2016 
2012-2013 2015 
2012-2013 2016 
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A key observation from the results obtained while experimenting with the trust models on 
various years is that, lesser the time interval between the training and testing years data, higher is 
the hotspots matching accuracy. Considering the Opinion-based model with Heuristic method, the 
approximate hotspots matching is 50% when training years are 2012-2013 and testing year is 2013 
or when training years are 2015-2016 and testing year is 2016. However, the matching percentage 
drops to approximately 27 when training years are 2012-2013 and testing year is 2015 or when 
training years are 2012-2013 and testing year is 2016. These results indicate that the CAD and 
UCR data of consecutive years resemble more closely as compared to when there is a time interval 
between them. Thus, taking these results into consideration along with the fact that HPPS generates 
hotspots by considering the social harm events in a weighted manner, assigning more weightage 
to recent records, it can be said that it is better to train the HPPS on recent data while using the 
trust models for assigning trust to real-time social harm events. 
4.5 Summary 
The above sections have discussed the rationale for using the UCR data for training the HPPS and 
the CAD, RMS and UCR data for evaluating the trust models. Results from different experiments, 
performed for comparing various models incorporated as part of the trust framework in T-CDASH 
are detailed. The results indicated that the Opinion-based model with heuristics method proves to 
be the most optimal model for associating trust with social harm events. All the trust models 
remained agnostic to seasonal changes in social harms occurring throughout the year. Also, the 
results obtained from performing data cross validation using Rolling Windows and Rolling Origin 
techniques proved to be consistent with the observations of Tashman [29]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This thesis results in a distributed web application, T-CDASH, that provides a collaborative 
environment to various stakeholders including the IMPD, community and citizens. T-CDASH 
predicts location and type of social harm events likely to occur in future. This thesis provides a 
means for processing and interrelating real-world social harm data from various sources including 
CAD, RMS and UCR. It also introduces a framework for assigning trust to real-time social harm 
events reported to T-CDASH. The trust framework includes different trust models each having a 
unique way of associating trust with the social harm incidents. Various experiments are performed 
with the trust models for analyzing their performance using social harm data from multiple years. 
This thesis concludes by indicating the optimal model for assigning trust to real-time social harm 
events. Following are the contributions of the thesis: 
• A distributed web application, T-CDASH, is developed and empirically validated using 
experiments that are performed on real-world social harm records for mitigating social harm.  
• A procedure to process and interrelate 911’s call for service data (CAD) and post-investigation 
data (RMS and UCR) is proposed. 
• Trust framework with six trust models: Ground-truth, Optimistic, Pessimistic, Average, 
Random and Opinion-based model, is created for associating trust with social harm events. 
• Opinion-based model with Heuristic method, taking into consideration social harm event 
attributes while assigning trust, proves to be the most efficient trust model. 
• Two time series data cross validation techniques involving Rolling Origin and Rolling 
Windows are incorporated to analyze its impact on association of trust with social harm events. 
• Finally, it can be concluded that all the social harm incidents cannot be randomly trusted. Thus, 
it is necessary to incorporate a trust framework for associating trust with social harm events. 
This thesis can be extended in many possible directions in future. Additional trust models that 
take into consideration other aspects associated with social harm incidents such as the number of 
times an incident is reported, and the incident severity can be incorporated while estimating an 
incident’s trustworthiness. In terms of model comparison metrics, other techniques such as Earth 
Movers Distance [46] can be incorporated for measuring the hotspot matching accuracy of the 
models. 
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